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Abstract- Switching, fault currents, lightning and other 
transient phenomena produce electromagnetic fields that may 
disturb the normal functioning of a high voltage power 
substation. With the advent of the ‘smart grid’ – where 
electronic control and communication equipment are integrated 
within the substation – understanding of the electromagnetic 
environment and the resulting interferences is becoming very 
important. This paper uses an example of a particular 
400/220kV substation in Romania to analyse its behaviour from 
the point of view of transient stability and faults. The results of 
the transient analysis in terms of currents will then be used to 
excite an electromagnetic model with the aim to predict the field 
distribution within the substation during the transient. These 
results will in turn be used to identify the EMI ‘hot spots’ within 
the substation.  
Index Terms-- EMI, fault analysis, smart grid, substation, 
transient stability. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Power systems need to operate under increasingly complex 
conditions and situations. The recent large implementation 
and penetration of renewable generation and demand have 
introduced new challenges to the operation of the electric 
grid. To cope with these challenging conditions the overall 
system’s operation requires new and innovative approaches in 
order to enhance the performances of the power grid. One of 
the novel ways is the concept of a smart grid. Sensing nodes, 
communication networks and information systems are 
embedded and integrated into the power network to create a 
‘smart’ grid that is able to manage almost autonomously all 
operating conditions by itself. A smart grid is a power system 
that enables real-time communication and control between 
the consumer and the utility such that the energy usage is 
optimised. It is able to consider different aspects, such as cost 
and technical and environmental constrains, when providing 
an optimum power supply to the customer. To operate in such 
a mode the smart grid will utilise digital information 
technology to create a more efficient, reliable and responsive 
network that is flexible. Communication within a smart grid 
will not be limited to that between the consumer and the 
utility only, but will include channels between digital relays, 
so that information could be exchanged between relays 
without necessarily involving the control centre. This type of 
communication networking will provide a self-managing 
capability that will allow the smart grid to develop different 
strategies in the protection and control of the system. The 
smart grid architecture aims to provide overall power network 
monitoring, create control strategies to maintain the system 
performance and security and reduce the cost of operation, 
maintenance and system availability planning. The control 
built within a smart grid will allow the flexibility to handle 
distributed resources, stochastic demand, to adapt to new 
conditions of operation and to respond in an optimal manner 
to smart appliances connected to the grid [1-7].   
Consequently, a smart grid has the potential to improve the 
efficiency and reliability of the power delivery; however, due 
to its increased complexity and dependence on technologies 
that were not previously part of the power grid, the smart grid 
may be susceptible to factors that will affect negatively its 
normal functioning. Some of these factors result from 
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI). All power grid devices 
are exposed to electromagnetic (EM) fields of natural or man-
made origin, radiated directly into devices or conducted via 
the power, signal or ground connections. A smart grid may 
contain a large number of data communication channels, in 
support of applications with divergent functions, which can 
all be degraded by electromagnetic interference. These 
functions have different reliability requirements, correlating 
with different levels of data flow reliability, and may require 
different radiated and conducted immunity levels [8]. 
Our research aims to develop the understanding of the 
electromagnetic environment in which the smart grid will 
function and identify possible EMC/EMI issues. EMC has to 
be considered to ensure continuous reliable operation in many 
locations where the smart grid equipment may operate. 
Components and devices in the smart grid system are 
subjected to a wide range of conducted and radiated noise 
sources that are disruptive to all electronic equipment.  
The substations in a power network afford one of the most 
severe electromagnetic environments where the equipment of 
a smart grid has to function correctly and reliably. The term 
“substation” describes the physical location in the grid that 
contains transformers, circuit breakers, capacitor banks, 
voltage regulators, sensors, protective relays and other 
equipment necessary for controlling and distributing electric 
power. Substations provide critical interconnections and are 
located throughout the grid for generation (as part of a power 
plant), transmission and distribution systems, and for 
distributed generation (DG) projects. The primary voltages at 
these substations will vary depending on the location. These 
substations can be as simple as a few circuit breakers or 
include complex systems covering large areas. For the 
purpose of this EMI discussion, the substation EM 
environment is defined as an area of high EM fields, 
including transients from switching that are higher than those 
found in other portions of the distribution system. The physical substation environment is generally the area 
bounded by a grounded fence around the substation yard 
and/or building and the area extending a few meters outside 
the fence [8]. Substations are very complex in their protection 
and control schemes.  
The microprocessor-based protective relays have recently 
been replacing electromechanical ones, especially at major 
substations. These devices not only offer protection, but also 
act as intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) that perform 
control functions, metering, substation automation, etc. The 
communication between these devices is currently serial 
using copper wires; the trend, however, is to replace wires 
between devices with Station Bus technology using Ethernet 
IP connectivity over fibre-optic cable and to network 
communication protocols for new or expanded installations. 
The power line carrier (PLC) transmitters/receivers, 
microwave and optical fibre communication multiplexers 
used in conjunction with protective relays to provide pilot 
protection schemes are now IEDs. 
In this work, we have analysed – through simulation – a 
high voltage substation.  The aim was to build a simulation 
model capable of simulating the transient processes and 
phenomena that can produce EMC noise that may potentially 
affect the smart grid equipment within the substation. This 
paper has analysed the behaviour of a 400/220kv high voltage 
substation in Romania called Rosiori for the transient stability 
and fault analysis. The results of the transient analysis in 
terms of currents will be used as excitation in an 
electromagnetic model of the substation with the aim to find 
electromagnetic field distribution. These results will then be 
used to identify EMI ‘hot spots’ within the substation. The 
placement of the sensitive control electronic equipment will 
be optimized so that the hot spots are avoided, hence reducing 
the danger of equipment malfunction.  
II.  SMART GRID AUTOMATED SUBSTATION 
In substations the power grid equipment is installed, such 
as transformers, circuit breakers, capacitor banks, voltage 
regulator protection relays, sensors and control equipment for 
power system operation. Currently, the majority of this 
conventional equipment relies on mechanical components. 
There is a trend, however, to replace electromechanically 
actuated relays with microprocessor based relays, especially 
in major substations. These new relays can act as intelligent 
electronic devices and perform extra duties, such as control 
and metering.    
Substation automation systems are categorised into three 
hierarchical levels, which are found in most implementations 
as physical levels (Fig. 1) [8]. The levels are referred to as: 
the process level, the bay level and the station level. The 
process level refers to the individual power system equipment 
in the substation represented by the process interface, e.g. 
circuit breakers, transformers, electronic current transformers 
(ECT), electronic voltage transformers (EVT) and merging 
units. The bay level consists of bay protection and control 
IEDs hosting the related functions. The station level consists 
typically of the substation computer with central functions, 
human machine interface (HMI) and the gateway to the 
network control centre. The station and bay levels are 
connected by the station bus. The bay and process levels are 
nowadays still connected by a lot of parallel copper wires but 
in the near future, as the need for more information exchange 
increases, these will be replaced by a process bus. A 
comprehensive set of standards, the IEC61850 series, has 
been developed to define the requirements for such 
communication networks and systems in substations [9].   
Fig. 1 The system architecture of a substation automation system [8]
 
Currently, most of the automated substations present a 
heterogeneous mixture of technologies where the modern 
IEC61850 structure works in parallel with an analog 
instrumentation channel serving a relay which will usually 
actuate an electromechanical protection device.  
One of the important elements of an automatic substation is 
the merging unit (MU) (Fig 1). The merging units are analog 
to digital data collection devices which sample and digitize 
electrical quantities. The electrical quantities are analog or 
digital signals which are of interest. Analog quantities include 
voltage and current signals from potential transformers (PTs) 
and current transformers (CTs), transformer temperature 
signals from resistance temperature detectors (RTDs), 
transformer turns ratios from potentiometers, etc. Digital 
quantities include auxiliary contact outputs. 
The MUs are placed physically close to the signals which 
they monitor. This arrangement minimises the potential for 
signal corruption under normal equipment exploitation. The 
MUs include usually a weatherised exterior suitable for 
outdoor and extreme physical conditions common in 
substations. Although these MUSs are tested to conform to 
standards such as IEC 60255-25, IEC 60255-22-4 and IEC 
61000-4-3, this may not be enough as field levels than can 
exist within substations could be larger [11,14] than the ones 
specified by the above mentioned standards. Therefore, there 
is a need to develop methodologies and simulation tools that 
allow prediction and calculation of electromagnetic field 
emissions in such environments.   
III.  SUBSTATION SIMULATION MODEL  
In this research, a specific case of a power substation 
located in Romania at Rosiori is used. Although at the moment this substation is not integrated with IEDs, it will be 
useful to understand the electromagnetic environment in such 
a substation prior to installing the IDES.  
As the first stage of this study, the substation was modelled 
using ERACS [17], a power system analysis software. There 
are several solvers available within ERACS: load flow, fault 
analysis, harmonic impedance and transient stability solvers. 
The main aim of this part of the study was to quantify and 
understand the transient currents that may occur within the 
substation equipment while different transient phenomena 
take place.  
The substation consists of three outgoing feeders and one 
compensation coil, together with an autotransformer, at 
400kV and three outgoing feeders on the 220 kV side. The 
details of the Rosiori 400/220 kV substation components are 
presented in Table 1 [12]. 
 
TABLE I 
ROSIORI SUBSTATION COMPONENTS 
Components of 400kV power station 
1  Overhead line Gadalin 
2  Overhead line Mukachevo 
3  Overhead line Oradea 
4  400MVA Autotransformer 400/220 KV 
5  100MVAr Reactance coil 400 KV 
Component of 220kV power station 
1  Overhead line Vetis 
2  Overhead line Baia Mare – double circuit 
 
The results of the load flow simulation, and then transient 
stability studies while applying fault at each of the busbars as 
disturbances within the Rosiori substation, are detailed in the 
following sections.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Load flow analysis of Rosiori substation. 
 
 
A.  Load Flow Analysis 
There are several purposes of load flow analysis, such as to 
calculate the steady state operation conditions of the power 
generation or transmission system for a given set of busbar 
loads; however, for the case under consideration the load flow 
analysis was necessary for the subsequent transient stability 
study. The results of the load flow analysis for the Rosiori 
substation are presented in Fig 2.  
Based on the load flow analysis, the total real power 
generation (PG) is 600.74MW which is sufficient for real 
power demand at load (PL) of 600MW. The total generated 
reactive power (QG) is 564.796MVAr satisfying the 
necessary reactive power at the load (QL) of 550MVAr. 
Table II shows the summary of the results of the load flow 
analysis for the Rosiori substation using ERACS. 
 
Oradea (TPP) Mukachevo (TPP)
Vetis Baiamare 3 - circuit 1 Baiamare 3 - circuit 2
auto transformer Vetis (CCP)
Gadalin (Flue Gas)
Mukachevo load Shunt reactance
Oradea load Gadalin loadTABLE II 
RESULT OF LOAD FLOW ANALYSIS 
 
B.  Fault Analysis 
Under normal conditions of operation the maximum 
magnetic field intensity within 400 to 500 kV substations, 
such as Rosiori, is expected to be between 1.5 to 3 A/m [14]. 
This level of magnetic field intensity should be tolerated by 
the merging units. However, in the case of a short circuit 
fault, intensities as high as 160 A/m have been reported [14]. 
Such large magnetic field intensity values can damage 
electronic equipment such as MUs. To calculate the magnetic 
field one first has to calculate the fault current. In this work 
the fault analysis option within ERACS has been used to 
calculate the fault currents and voltages. The following 
scenarios have been simulated: a single phase to earth, phase 
to phase, two phases to earth, and a three phase short circuit 
fault. These faults are applied at all busbars in the circuit 
model. The summary of fault analysis results is presented in 
Table III. The maximum fault current observed for these 
simulations is when a phase to phase and two phases to earth 
faults are applied at BUS 3. For these cases the fault current 
magnitude is 12.306 kA. 
TABLE III 
RESULT OF FAULT ANALYSIS 
 
Element 
Fault type (kA) 
Single phase 
to earth (kA) 
Phase to 
phase (kA) 
Two phase to 
earth (kA) 
Three 
phase (kA) 
Busbar 1  IL1: 10.299 
IL2: 0 
IL3: 0 
IL1: 0 
IL2: 7.796 
IL3: 7.796 
IL1: 0 
IL2: 8.05 
IL3: 9.189 
IL1: 7.382 
IL2: 7.382 
IL3: 7.382 
Busbar 2  IL1: 10.169 
IL2: 0 
IL3: 0 
IL1: 0 
IL2: 7.783 
IL3: 7.783 
IL1: 0 
IL2: 8.001 
IL3: 9.108 
IL1: 7.378 
IL2: 7.378 
IL3: 7.378 
Busbar 3  IL1: 0.001 
IL2: 0 
IL3: 0 
IL1: 0 
IL2: 12.306 
IL3: 12.306 
IL1: 0 
IL2: 12.306 
IL3: 12.306 
IL1: 11.918 
IL2: 11.918 
IL3: 11.918 
Busbar 4  IL1: 0.001 
IL2: 0 
IL3: 0 
IL1: 0 
IL2: 12.258 
IL3: 12.258 
IL1: 0 
IL2: 12.258 
IL3: 12.258 
IL1: 11.866 
IL2: 11.866 
IL3: 11.866 
C.  Transient Stability Analysis 
Following the fault analysis a transient stability analysis 
was undertaken. For such analysis the assumption is that the 
dynamics of the system is dominated by the transient 
behaviour of motor loads, generators and governors AVRs. 
This implies that transmission time delays and distribution 
network mesh time constants are negligibly small compared 
with the motor and the generator behaviour [13].  
For the Rosiori substation case the results of the transient 
stability analysis simulations, when a three phase short-circuit 
fault has been applied to BUS 1, are presented in Fig. 3. The 
currents in each phase (L1, L2, L3) and the AC and DC 
components of the fault current are shown. As the data about 
the four generators connected to the system – Mukachevo, 
Oradea, Gadalin and Vetis – was not readily available for the 
transient stability simulation, typical average values of the 
synchronous-machines constants were assumed [16]. For the 
above situation the simulation results show that there is a 
sudden drop in power at 0.05s; however, the system tries to 
recover to a stable state. This will result in the oscillating 
transient state shown graphically in Figs 3, 4 and 5.  
 Fig. 3 Transient analysis results due to 3-phase fault at BUS 1. 
 
Fig. 4 Transient currents for each of the 3 phase (3phase fault at BUS 1) 
 
From the point of view of the EMC/EMI analysis there is a 
need to understand not only the magnitude of the fault 
currents but also their harmonic content. Higher frequency 
currents are expected to be more detrimental in terms of 
coupling to other equipment within the substation. A Fast 
Fourier Technique (FFT) in Matlab was employed to 
determine the harmonic content of the transient currents 
obtained from the ERACS simulation. The results of the FFT 
analysis are summarised below in Fig. 6.  
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Fig. 5 AC component of the transient power 
 
As shown in Fig. 6 the symmetrical component of the fault 
currents has the largest magnitude around 6 kA and the same 
frequency as the fundamental harmonic (50 Hz). The DC 
component of the asymmetrical fault currents has smaller 
amplitude of about 2.8 kA. 
 
Fig. 6 Harmonic for each phase 
 
It is clear from the results of the FFT analysis that there are 
no significant higher harmonic currents excited when a 
transient stability simulation is considered. Hence the only 
aspect that has to be considered from the EMC/EMI point of 
view is the magnitude of the currents and their flowing paths 
within the substation.   
IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Fault current and transient stability simulations of the 
Rosiori substation were successfully completed using 
commercial package ERACS. The analysis assumed that the 
substation is connected to a large grid. The harmonic content 
of the asymmetrical fault currents calculated by ERACS was 
determined using the FFT analysis in Matlab. It has been 
shown that most of the power existent in the transient signal 
is either DC or the fundamental harmonic (50Hz), hence for 
EMC/EMI analysis the magnitude of the current will be the 
most important parameter. Going further the results of the 
transient analysis and fault analysis in terms of currents will 
be used in the future to excite an electromagnetic model of 
the Rosiori substation such that the electromagnetic field 
distributions within the substation will be obtained for these 
currents. These results will in turn be used to identify the EMI 
‘hot spots’ within the substation. Another aspect that that will 
be studied is the transient effects when switching of a 
disconnector or a circuit breakers, especially in the case of 
inductive loads, takes place. The switching and disconnecting 
is expected to produce transient currents with much higher 
harmonic content which may couple significant energy 
through common-mode currents to electronic equipment 
installed in the substation switchyard.   
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